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NOTES 
HABEAS CORPUS-Custody and Release From Custody 
Requirements of Habeas Corpus-Viability of 
McNally v. Hill in the Modern Context 
Section 2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code requires that 
a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus be "in custody."1 As a corol-
lary of the "custody" requirement, the common law tradition re-
quired that the effect of the writ must be the petitioner's "release 
from custody.''2 Because the United States Constitution3 and the 
federal habeas corpus statutes4 guarantee the availability of the 
writ in general terms, it is to the common law that the courts have 
consistently turned for the definition of these terms and for the 
restrictive effect of these requirements on the availability of the writ 
in particular situations. 5 However, recent decisions by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court have questioned the continued viability of the common law 
approach. 
The traditional definition of these concepts, adhered to by both 
state and federal courts, is best illustrated by reference to the 1934 
landmark Supreme Court case of McNally v. Hill.6 In McNally, a 
prisoner sought a writ of habeas corpus in order to attack a four 
year sentence which was to run consecutive to the t\V'o admittedly 
valid concurrent sentences which he was then serving.7 The Court 
was satisfied that the case was one which presented a case or con-
troversy, 8 but it deemed the petition for the writ of habeas corpus 
to be premature since, the court reasoned, "a sentence which the 
1. "The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless (inter alia) 
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States ••.. " 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3) (1964). 
2. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 427 n.38 (1963). See generally Note, 109 U. PA. L. REY. 
1018 (1961). The words "for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of the restraint 
of liberty" in R.Ev. STAT. § 752 (1875) were omitted from the present statute because 
they were considered to be merely descriptive of the writ. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th 
Cong., 1st Sess. A-178 (1947). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
4. 28 U.S.C. § 224l(a) (1964). The jurisdiction to issue the writ is not part of the 
inherent power of the federal courts. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). 
5. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963); McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934). 
See generally Oaks, Legal History in the High Court, 64 MICH. L. R.Ev. 451 (1966); 
Note, 59 MICH. L. REY. 312 (1960); 45 MINN. L. REV. 453 (1961). 
6. 293 U.S. 131 (1934); see SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 30 (1965). 
7. The grounds alleged to justify issuance of the writ were that the petitioner would 
be eligible for parole after serving one third of his sentence; and that, although he had 
already served one third of the admittedly valid first and second sentences, his parole 
was precluded by reason of the outstanding, but allegedly invalid, third sentence. 
293 U.S. at 134 (1934). 
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the custody does not exist until 
the petitioner is actually serving the sentence he attacks. 
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prisoner has not begun to serve cannot be the cause of restraint 
which the statute makes the subject of inquiry."9 In addition, 
the Court adopted the "release from custody" requirement by stat-
ing that "the only judicial relief authorized [is] the discharge of 
the prisoner or his admission to bail, and that only if his detention 
were found to be unlawful."10 Since the petitioner had failed to 
qualify under either the "custody" or "release from custody" re-
quirements, the Court denied the petition and refused to hear the 
case on the merits.11 
The unequivocal holding in McNally has forced ingenious 
petitioners in the federal courts to seek other writs or remedies in 
an attempt to gain review of sentences to commence in the future. 
Several possible paths have, however, already been effectively elimi-
nated. The Supreme Court held that Rule 35 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure,12 which rule allows a federal court to correct 
a future sentence improperly imposed after a valid conviction, does 
not extend to obtaining a retrial for a sentence resulting from an 
invalid conviction.13 In addition, petitioners have been unsuccessful 
in utilizing the Declaratory Judgment Act14 to attack sentences to 
commence in the future.15 A third avenue of attack has been fore-
closed by Heflin v. United States,16 wherein a majority of the Su-
preme Court stated that section 2255 of Title 28 of the United 
States Code, an additional remedy available to federal prisoners in 
their trial court districts, is analogous to section 2241 and is thus 
also inappropriate.17 In spite of language in section 2255 which 
9. 293 U.S. at 138 (1934). 
10. Id. at 136-37. 
11. Following the lead of the McNally case, both state and lower federal courts 
have held that a petitioner serving two concurrent sentences, although "in custody" 
under both, cannot attack either unless he meets one of two requirements. First, he 
must successfully attack both. See, e.g., Collins v. Klinger, 353 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1965); 
In re Shekoski's Petitions, 239 F. Supp. 996 (E.D. Mich. 1965). Second, the time already 
served must qualify as a full satisfaction of the admittedly valid sentence and enable 
his immediate "release from custody." See, e.g., United States v. Rundle, 240 F. Supp. 
323 (E.D. Pa. 1965); United States ex rel. Brown v. Warden, 231 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964); Hoffman v. United States, 244 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1957) (same rule applied under 
28 u.s.c. § 2255 (1964)). 
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35. For an illustration of the problems in correcting an illegal 
sentence when matters dehors the record are involved, compare Johnson v. United 
States, 334 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1964), with Gilinsk.y v. United States, 335 F.2d 914 (9th 
Cir. 1964). 
13. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). 
14. 28 u.s.c. § 2201 (1964). 
15. "It was the primary purpose of the act to have a declaration of rights not 
theretofore determined, and not to determine whether rights theretofore adjudicated 
have been properly adjudicated." Clark v. Memolo, '174 F.2d 978, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1949); 
accord, Forsythe v. Ohio, 333 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1964); Tuckson v. Clemmer, 231 F.2d 
658 (4th Cir. 1956). 
16. 358 U.S. 415 (1959). 
17. A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Con-
gress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was im-
posed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the 
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declares that a petition may be brought under the section "at any 
time," the Court stated that in enacting section 2255 Congress in-
tended to incorporate "the basic principle of habeas corpus that 
relief is only available to one entitled to be released from custody."18 
Other more fortunate petitioners have sucessfully obtained re-
lief on a hybrid theory adopted by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Morgan.19 The petitioner in Morgan had received, due to 
a federal conviction which he was attacking in the federal courts, a 
heavier sentence under a recidivist statute in a subsequent New 
York conviction. The majority of the Court allowed him to seek a 
motion in the nature of the writ of error coram nobis under the all 
writs statute20 to attack his federal sentence which he had fully 
served. Since the petitioner, who was imprisoned in New York, 
was unable to obtain relief in that state's courts, this extraordinary 
remedy was made available "under circumstances compelling such 
action to achieve justice."21 The dissenters accused the Court of 
"resurrecting the ancient writ of error coram nobis from limbo to 
which it had presumably been relegated" by both the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and section 2255.22 Furthermore, since Morgan, 
several United States Courts of Appeals have allowed the use 
of this same motion to attack a sentence that the petitioner has 
not yet begun to serve.23 The propriety of this extension of the 
motion is questionable since, unlike Morgan, these petitioners will 
eventually be "in custody" and thus be able to apply for the writ 
of habeas corpus; their circumstances are seemingly not sufficiently 
"compelling" to justify relief under the Morgan rationale. 
It is uncertain whether the Supreme Court would approve the 
application of the coram nobis motion in this setting. However, if 
court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was 
in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral 
attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or 
correct the sentence. 
28 u.s.c. § 2255 (1964). 
18. Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 421 (1959); accord, Ramsey v. United 
States, 351 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1965); Williams v. United States, 267 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 
1959). 
19. 346 U.S. 502 (1954). 
20. "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue 
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agree• 
able to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964). 
21. 346 U.S. at 511. The courts of New York would not review the judgment of 
another jurisdiction on habeas corpus or coram nobis, People v. McCullough, 300 
N.Y. 107, 110, 89 N.E.2d 335, 337 (1949). 
22. 346 U.S. at 513 (Minton, J., dissenting). FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b) provides that "writs 
of coram nobis ••• are abolished •••• " The Revisers Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 state 
that the section "restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the nature of the 
ancient writ of error coram nobis." H.R. REP. No. 308, op. cit. supra note 2, A-180. 
23. Owensby v. United States, 353 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1965); Johnson v. United 
States, 344 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1965); Thomas v. United States, 271 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 
1959); Tucker v. United States, 235 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1956). But see United States 
v. Baker, 158 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Ark. 1958), 
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it would, various practical considerations indicate that a preferable 
solution to the problem would be an expansion of the writ of habeas 
corpus by a redefinition of the "custody" and "release from custody" 
requirements. First, the motion in the nature of the writ of error 
coram nobis would only apply to petitioners attacking a federal 
sentence.24 Second, the errors which may be attacked under coram 
nobis are limited in number.25 Third, the providing of a simple, 
comprehensive remedy to all prisoners would avoid the problems 
inherent in affording them two different remedial writs. 
A liberalized definition of the habeas corpus "custody" require-
ment has recently been adopted by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit in Martin v. Virginia.26 The petitioner, who was 
captured after his escape from an admittedly valid fifteen year sen-
tence, was convicted and sentenced to three and five years for escape 
and grand larceny respectively. the sentences to run consecutive to 
his original sentence. He attacked the validity of these latter sen-
tences, which he had not yet begun to serve, by means of a writ of 
habeas corpus. Recognizing that it must bring the facts within the 
"custody" requirement of the fedel'.al habeas corpus statute, the 
court relied on the Supreme Court's extension, in Jones v. Cunning-
ham,21 of the "custody" concept so as to include a petitioner on 
parole.28 The Court had stated in Jones that a man is "in custody" 
if there is any restraint on his liberty "to do the things which in this 
country free men are entitled to do."29 The Martin court noted 
that since the existence of the petitioner's future sentences could 
delay or prevent his eligibility for parole on his first sentence,80 
such future sentences amounted to a sufficient "restraint on his 
liberty" for the petitioner to be presently considered "in custody" 
within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute.81 
24. A motion in the nature of the writ of error coram nobis is a step in the crim• 
inal case and jurisdiction lies in the federal trial court where convicted. United States 
v. Morgan, 846 U.S. 502, 505 n.4 (1954). Habeas corpus, however, is a separate civil 
proceeding. See, e.g., Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 494 (1885). 
25. Traditionally coram nobis is only available for matters dehors the trial record, 
for errors of fact rather than errors of law, and for cases in which it would appear 
that a retrial would reach a different result. See FRANK, CoRAM Noms (1958); Note, 82 
FORDHAM L. REv. 808, 804-15 (1964); Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 154, 159-61 (1965). 
26. 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965); see O'Brien v. McClaughry, 209 Fed. 816 (8th Cir. 
1918), where another court prior to McNally granted habeas corpus relief on similar 
grounds. 
27. 871 U.S. 236 (1963); Note, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 228 (1963). 
28. Although most of the cases prior to Jones in denying habeas corpus to a 
petitioner on parole spoke in terms of mootness, it would appear that the actual 
ground for the decisions was the failure of parole to constitute custody. See Johnson 
v. Eckle, 269 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1959); Strand v. Schmittroth, 251 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 855 U.S. 886 (1957); United States ex rel. St. Johns v. Cummins, 238 F.2d 
187 (2d Cir. 1956); Factor v. Fox, 175 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1949). 
29 • .571 U.S. at 248. 
SO. Although the petitioner would have been eligible for parole in 1968, the addi-
tional two sentences extended that date to 1966 • .549 F.2d at 78.!J n.l. 
Sl. Id. at 784. Although a "free man" by definition could never be eligible for 
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Accepting arguendo the validity of the Martin court's assump-
tion that the Supreme Court would today consider this burden upon 
eligibility for parole as a restraint of liberty within the meaning .of 
the statute, the court either ignored or implicitly expanded the 
additional requirement that the effect of the writ be the petitioner's 
"release from custody.''32 The petitioner could not have been re-
leased from custody, for he was at that time serving his first sentence, 
and even if he were to be paroled, he would still be "in custody" 
under the rationale of Jones v. Cunningham. However, the court's 
expansion of the "release from custody" requirement may have been 
justified in light of the Supreme Court's progressive liberalization of 
the "custody" rule and the correlative departure from common law 
concepts.33 Moreover, strict adherence to the traditional "release 
from custody" requirement would effectively negate most of the 
advantages realized through the expansion of the "custody" require-
ment. For the extension of the "custody" rule to be meaningful, it 
must be accompanied by a corresponding expansion of the "release 
from custody" requirement so as to include the release or removal of 
the restraint of liberty attacked in the writ. Thus, the effect of the 
writ of habeas corpus may be a partial rather than a total removal 
of the restraints on the petitioner's liberty.34 
parole and parole is only a privilege and not a right, it would seem that the ability 
to be eligible for parole is a right. But cf. Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 349 (1941). 
The court in Martin made a point not to limit its holding to a petitioner like Martin 
who presented a strong case for parole. 349 F.2d at 784. In effect, the Martin court 
in expanding the scope of the custody requirement in this manner engaged in the 
same type of legal fiction employed by the Supreme Court earlier in the century to 
expand the habeas corpus requirement that the attacked sentence be "void for want 
of jurisdiction" until it finally encompassed any sentence attacked for "denial of due 
process." See note 33 infra and accompanying text. For an illuminating discussion of 
the use of legal fictions in the expansion .of habeas corpus, see Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 
657, 660-62 (1948). 
32. See note IO supra and accompanying text. 
33. In fact it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that habeas corpus 
became a remedy primarily for post-conviction attack in cases of criminal commit• 
ments. See Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States 1776-1865, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 243, 245 
(1965). Throughout the last century the writ as a post-conviction remedy in federal 
and some state courts evolved from one which merely attacked a conviction which was 
void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to one which attacked denial of due 
process. See, e.g., Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942); Frank v. Mangum, 
237 U.S. 309 (1915); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State 
Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461, 465-66 (1960); Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 657, 660-62 
(1948). 
34. It would appear that Martin is not the first decision which has attempted to 
expand the "release from custody" requirement. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), rejected this requirement 
where a petitioner attacked his mistreatment at the hands of prison authorities. In 
doing so the court relied on the seldomly invoked provision of § 2243 of the United 
States Code which states that a court presented with a habeas corpus petition may 
"dispose of the ••• [case] as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964). How-
ever, the Supreme Court in Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960), seemingly foreclosed 
the attempted use of § 2243 as an expansive device where the custody and release 
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Although this expansion of federal habeas corpus should be suf-
ficient to accommodate petitioners to the federal courts, the avail-
ability of the enlarged writ in state courts warrants examination. 
The federal habeas corpus statutes require that a state prisoner ex-
haust his state remedies before he can apply for federal habeas 
corpus.35 One of these state remedies may be state habeas corpus 
proceedings. Since state courts have generally applied the McNally 
rationale in state habeas corpus proceedings, the states themselves 
must contribute to the simplification of this area. An adequate 
habeas corpus,36 coram nobis,37 or other statutory post-conviction 
remedy,38 which would afford relief in the McNally situation should 
be provided. The expanded availability of such state remedies would 
decrease the opportunities for federal interference with state crimi-
nal procedures, eliminate unnecessary expense generated by collat-
eral attacks, and alleviate the case load in the federal courts. 
By virtue of its recent decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens 
v. Myers,39 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has made such a con-
tribution. Confronted with facts indistinguishable from those in 
McNally, the court chose to expand the meaning of "custody" to 
from custody requirements of McNally are not met. Chief Justice Warren in a dis-
senting opinion urged that § 2243 is authority to modify the release from custody 
requirement and to provide appropriate other relief by absolving a petitioner from 
the stigma of an invalid conviction for which he had already served the full sentence. 
362 U.S. at 583. 
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964); see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); .Bator, Finality 
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
441 (1963); Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Postcon-
viction Review, 50 A.B.A.J. 928 (1964). On exhaustion of state remedies, see generally 
Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1303 (1965). 
36. Some states are still interpreting habeas corpus in its narrow common law 
usage. E.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Auten, 211 Ark. 703, 202 S.W.2d 763 (1947); 
McKenna v. Tinsley, 141 Colo. 63, 346 P .2d 584 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 981 
(1960); Curran v. Woolley, 48 Del. 382, 104 A.2d 771 (1954). Other states have expanded 
the writ to cover an asserted denial of constitutional rights. See, e.g., ·wojculewicz v. 
Cummings, 145 Conn. II, 138 A.2d 512, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 969 (1958); Sewell v. 
Lainson, 244 Iowa 555, 57 N.W.2d 556 (1953); Springer v. Hungerford, 100 N.H. 503, 
130 A.2d 538 (1957); Ex parte Rose, 122 N.J.L. 507, 6 A.2d 388 (1939); Ex parte Story, 
203 P.2d 474 (Okla. Crim. App. 1949); State ex rel. Doxtater v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 593, 
22 N.W.2d 685 (1946). See generally Fairchild, Post-Conviction Rights and Remedies 
in Wisconsin, 1965 Wis. L. R.Ev. 52. 
37. The primary post-conviction remedy in New York is coram nobis. See Note, 32 
FORDHAM L. REv. 803, 804-16 (1964). See generally FRANK, op. cit. supra note 25. 
38. See Note, 61 CoLUM L. REv. 681 (1961); Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 154 (1965). 
39. 419 Pa. 1, 213 A.2d 613 (1965). Petitioner was serving a IO to 20 year robbery 
sentence. He sought habeas corpus to attack a life sentence which was to run consecu-
tive to the robbery sentence. The court thought it was "extremely improbable" that 
Stevens would ever be paroled on the robbery sentence with the life sentence to follow. 
Id. at 616 n.5. The petitioner had been denied the right to counsel for direct appeal 
of his life sentence. The dissent interpreted the possibility of an increase in retrials as 
a reason for denying habeas corpus until these premature cases came to trial. Id. at 
627-28 (Cohen, J., dissenting). 
178 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65 
include a sentence to be served in the future.40 Since Pennsylvania 
does not have a post-conviction habeas corpus statute, the state's 
highest court assumes final responsibility for defining the scope of its 
writ. The court postulated that since the use of the writ as a post-
conviction remedy was not foreseen when the common law rules 
as to its availability were established, a modem court should eschew 
the blind application of these rules and re-examine them in their 
modern context. The court noted that Pennsylvania has no express 
remedy for such a premature case once the time for appeal has ex-
pired.41 It concluded that it would be in the best interest of both 
the state and the petitioner to enable the state to act immediately 
upon the petitioner's motion, rather than to have to wait until the 
allegedly invalid sentence is actually being served. 
With the exception of Pennsylvania and Califomia,42 state 
courts, including those which have expanded the habeas corpus writ 
in other respects, appear to be following McNally in denying habeas 
corpus relief to petitioners who seek review of sentences to com-
mence in the future.43 Several state legislatures, however, have en-
acted post-conviction procedure statutes which may offer relief to 
the frustrated habeas corpus petitioner.44 Furthermore, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws promulgated in 
1955 the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act45 for the purpose 
of abolishing all other common law post-conviction remedies; one 
procedure was provided for the asserting of every jurisdictional, con-
stitutional, or other ground for collateral relief that was not pre-
viously litigated or waived. Although the Act has been substan-
40. Previously the court had followed the rule of McNally in Commonwealth 
ex rel. Lewis v. Ashe, 335 Pa. 575, 7 A.2d 296 (1939). For a discussion of the prior 
development of post-conviction habeas corpus in Pennsylvania, see Note, 20 U. P1rr. 
L. REv. 652 (1959). 
41. Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 11-12 n.15, 213 A.2d 613, 
619-20 n.15 (1965), wherein the court discusses the limited usefulness of coram nobis in 
Pennsylvania. Relying on Stevens the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth 
ex rel. Alexander v. Rundle, 213 A.2d 644 (Pa. Super. 1965), extended habeas corpus 
to a prisoner under a valid sentence who sought to attack a prior sentence from which 
he had been reparoled. See Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, supra, at 24-26, 
213 A.2d at 626-27 (Bell, C.J., concurring, but disagreeing with the court's extension of 
habeas corpus to every unlawful detention or restraint or conviction). 
42. In re Chapman, 43 Cal. 2d 385, 273 P.2d 817 (1954), 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 415 
(1955); Granucci, Review of Criminal Convictions by Habeas Corpus in California, 
15 liAsTINGS L.J. 189 (1963). 
43. See, e.g., Goodman v. State, 96 Ariz. 139, 393 P.2d 148 (1964); People ex rel. 
Martin v. Ragen, 401 Ill. 419, 82 N.E.2d 457 (1948); McLean v. Maxwell, 2 Ohio St. 
2d 226, 208 N.E.2d 139 (1965). 
44. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 to -7 (Smith-Hurd 1965); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (Supp. 1965). Illinois passed one of the first post-conviction 
statutes in 1949. See Comment, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 696, 703 (1964). The statute was 
amended in 1965 to extend the time period from 5 to 20 years. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 
§ 122-1 (Smith-Hurd 1965). 
45. UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE Acr; see Finan, Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act: One State's Experience, 2 HARv. J. LEG. 185 (1965). 
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tially adopted in only two states,46 it has been the model for similar 
statutes in several other states.47 The Act contains language which 
provides that a "petition for relief under this [subtitle] may be filed 
at any time."48 In construing this provision, the Maryland Supreme 
Court rejected the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 
similar language in section 225549 and granted relief to a petitioner 
in the McNally situation.50 It is hoped that courts in states which 
have enacted post-conviction statutes patterned after section 2255,51 
will also reconsider the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "at 
any time" provision. Petitioners who attack future sentences under 
these provisions might then be afforded the same relief which is 
now available under the Uniform Act. 
The history of the writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction 
remedy evidences a willingness by the courts to amplify the writ to 
comport with corresponding developments in other phases of the 
criminal process. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania were notably cognizant of this fact in 
liberalizing the "custody" and "release from custody" requirements 
of McNally. Since these decisions rest on a perceptive recognition of 
the modem evolution of criminal justice, they merit close examina-
tion by other state and federal courts. 
46. The act was adopted by Maryland in 1958, and amended in part in 1965. 
Mn. ANN. CoDE art. 27, §§ 645A-J (Supp. 1965). The act was adopted in Oregon in 
1959, ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 138.510-.680 (Supp. 1963). The act was adopted but subse-
quently repealed in Arkansas. Ark. Acts 1957, No. 419, repealed, Ark. Acts 1959, No. 
227. Maryland recently amended its act to comply with additional habeas corpus 
hearing requirements established by the Supreme Court in Townsend v. Sain, 372 
U.S. 293 (1963). See Finan, supra note 45, for a discussion of the Maryland enactment 
and new amendment. 
47. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (Supp. 1965); WYo. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 7-408.l to -408.8 (Supp. 1965). For a discussion of the Wyoming statute, see Raper, 
Post Conviction Remedies, 19 WYO. L.J. 213 (1965). 
48. UNIFORM Pos-r-CONVICTION PROCEDURE Acr § 1. 
49. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
50. See Simon v. Director, 235 Md. 626, 201 A.2d 371 (1964). This provision is now 
codified as Mn. ANN. ConE art. 27, 645A(b) (Supp. 1965). 
51. AI.AsKA R. CRIM. P. 35(b); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1, Note, 
17 u. FLA. L. REv. 617 (1965); KAN. REv. CODE OF CIV. P. § 60-1507(b) (1964). For a 
discussion of the Kansas statute see Foth 8: Palmer, Post Conviction Motions Under 
The Kansas Revised Code of Civil Procedure, 12 KAN. L. REv. 493 (1964); KY. R. CRIM, 
P. 11.42. 
